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Politics and Consumer Prices in Africa
Abstract
The motivations of the Arab Spring that have marked the history of humanity over the 
last  few months  have left  political  economists,  researchers,  governments  and international 
policymakers pondering over how the quality of political institutions affect consumer welfare 
in terms of commodity prices. This paper investigates the effect of political establishments on 
consumer prices in the African continent.  Findings suggest that democracies have a higher 
propensity to provide for institutions that keep inflationary pressures on commodity prices in 
check  than  authoritarian  regimes.   As  a  policy  implication,  improving  the  quality  of 
democratic institutions will  ameliorate consumer welfare through  lower inflation rates. Such 
government  quality  institutional  determinants  include,  among  others:  voice  and 
accountability, rule of law, regulation quality, control of corruption and press freedom.
JEL Classification: I30; O00; P00; Q00; P50 
Keywords:  Consumer prices; Political institutions; Welfare; Africa
1.Introduction 
The motivations of the Arab Spring and hitherto unanswered questions about some of 
its dynamics inspire this paper. The revolutions that have swept across  Africa and the Middle 
East stress the relative importance of political regimes on living standards. The geopolitical 
landscape in the last couple of months has centered around the inability of some political 
regimes to ensure the livelihoods of their citizens. Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Uganda, 
Zambia, Mauritania, Sudan, Western Sahara and most recently Nigeria are some countries 
that have witnessed major or minor unrests through techniques of civil resistance in sustained 
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campaigns  involving strikes,  demonstrations,  marches  and rallies.  Political  strife  plaguing 
many African countries seem to be centered around the need for basic livelihood. 
In retrospect, the rapid inflation in global food prices since 2000  and its acceleration 
between 2007-08 has shown that price shocks can pose significant threats to political stability 
in the developing world. “We will take to the streets in demonstrations  or we will steal,”  a 
30-year old woman said in 2008 as she queued outside a bakery in Egypt. Demonstrations and 
riots linked to consumer prices took place in over 30 countries between 2007-08. The Middle 
East witnessed food riots in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Yemen. In Ivory Coast, thousands 
marched to the  home of President Laurent Gbagbo chanting: “ we are hungry”, “life is too 
expensive”, “you are going to kill us”…etc. Similar demonstrations ensued in  many other 
African  countries,  including  Ethiopia,  Burkina  Faso,  Senegal,  Mozambique,  Mauritania, 
Cameroon and Guinea. In Latin America, violent clashes over rising food prices occurred in 
Guatemala, Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico and the Haitian prime minister was 
even  toppled  following  food  riots.  In  Asia,  people  took  to  the  streets  in  Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Thailand, India and the Philippines. Even North Korea experienced an incident in 
which  market  women  gathered  to  protest  against  restrictions  on  their  ability  to  trade  in 
food(Hendrix et al.,2009).
The above stylized facts point to the role political institutions play in food prices and 
vice-versa. The present paper aims to investigate the effect of politics on consumer prices in 
the  African  continent.  Data  and  methodology  are  presented  and  outlined  respectively  in 
Section 2. Empirical analysis is covered by Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
We examine a panel of 34 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB). Owing to constrains in data availability, dataset 
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spans from 1980 to 2010. Consistent with the literature, politics is measured with indicators of 
democracy,  autocracy and polity(Asongu, 2011a; Yang,2011). Inflation in terms of annual 
Consumer Price Index(CPI) is the outcome variable(Hendrix et al.,2009). Previous research 
has also substantially  demonstrated the correlation between political institutions and moment 
conditions of legal-origin, income-level and religious-domination(La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz 
& Williamson, 2003; Beck et al., 2003; Asongu, 2011bc; Yang, 2011). Thus we use these 
instruments  in  a  bid  to  address  the  issue  of  endogeneity.  Control  variables  include 
trade(openness),  public  investment  and  population  growth.  While  the  first  two  are  in 
percentages of GDP, the last is in annual growth rate. 
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Endogeneity 
While  political institutions might account for living standards in terms of consumer 
prices, a reverse causality cannot be ruled-out especially as social riots engineered by soaring 
food prices have recently toppled many political establishments in Africa and beyond. This 
potential  correlation  between independent  variables  and the error  term in the  equation  of 
interest(endogeneity)  is  taken  into  account  by  an  Instrumental  Variable  (IV)  estimation 
technique.
2.2.2 Estimation technique
 The IV estimation process of the paper shall adopt the following steps:
-justify  the  use  of  an  IV  over  an  OLS estimation  technique  with  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-verify that instrumental variables are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining 
variables (political-regime channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
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-assess the validity of the instruments by virtue of the Sargan Over-identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. 
Thus  the above methodology will entail the following regressions:
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigiPolitics )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ    υα ++ itiX      (1) 
  
Second-stage regression:
++= itit ChannelDemocraticCPI )(10 γγ +itChannelAutocratic )(2γ +itiXβ µ          (2) 
In the two equations, X is a set of exogenous control variables. For the first and second 
equations,  v  and u, respectively denote the disturbance terms. Instrumental variables include 
legal-origins, dominant-religions and income-levels
2.2.3  Robustness checks
In order to assess the robustness of findings, the paper: (1)uses an estimation technique 
that addresses the issue of endogeneity; (2) adopts two interchangeable sets of instruments; 
and (3) uses different  political-regime indicators. 
3. Empirical results
3.1 First-stage regressions
Table  1  investigates  the  role  of  instrumental  dynamics  in  the  quality  of  political 
institutions and consumer prices. This first-stage regression is the initial condition for the IV 
process  where-in  the  endogenous  components  of  the  political-regime  channels  must  be 
explained by the instruments contingent on other covariates (control variables). Clearly we 
notice from findings that distinguishing African countries by the instrumental dynamics helps 
elucidate  cross-country  differences  in  political  institutions.  Also,  results  for  inflation  are 
robust given their consistency with recent empirical literature (Asongu, 2011d) where-in, the 
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low level of inflation experienced by Francophone African civil-law countries is associated 
with their fixed-exchange rate regimes.
On average we notice that English common-law (Islam-oriented) countries have better 
democratic institutions than their French civil-law (Christian) counterparts. The comparative 
religious findings run counter to those of El Badawi, & Makdisi(2007). This contradiction is 
based  on  contextual  differences.   There  is  evidence  of  a  U-shape  relationship  between 
national wealth and the level of democracy with Low-income countries experiencing lower 
(higher) levels of democracy than Upper (Lower) middle income countries. 
Table 1: Endogenous variables and instruments (first-stage regressions)
Endogenous Explaining Variables Endogenous Variable
Democracy Polity(Revised) Autocracy Consumer Price
1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 
Instruments
Constant 1.475*** 1.061** -1.158 -0.106 2.805*** 1.109** 23.827*** 6.700**
(2.765) (2.364) (-1.407) (-0.154) (4.853) (2.281) (7.966) (2.502)
English  --- 2.138*** --- 2.651*** --- -0.418 --- 15.069***
(8.396) (6.747) (-1.518) (10.40)
French -2.138*** --- -2.651*** --- 0.418 --- -15.06*** ---
(-8.396) (-6.747) (1.518) (-10.40)
Christianity --- -0.485* --- -0.373 --- -0.065 --- 0.212
(-1.838) (-0.918) (-0.230) (0.138)
Islam 0.485* --- 0.373 --- 0.065 --- -0.212 ---
(1.838) (0.918) (0.230) (-0.138)
L.Income 1.239*** --- 3.329*** --- -2.180*** --- -1.845 ---
(4.094) (7.127) (-6.650) (-1.079)
M. Income --- 2.207*** --- 2.382*** --- -0.111 --- -1.723
(6.459) (4.520) (-0.300) (-0.909)
LMIncome --- -3.446*** --- -5.711*** --- 2.291*** --- 3.569*
(-9.651) (-10.37) (5.926) (1.816)
UMIncome 3.446*** --- 5.711**** --- -2.291*** --- -3.569* ---
(9.651) (10.37) (-5.926) (-1.816)
Control 
Variables 
Trade 0.008** 0.008** 0.011** 0.011** -0.003 -0.003 -0.099*** -0.099***
(2.227) (2.227) (1.987) (1.987) (-0.940) (-0.940) (-4.811) (-4.811)
Public Ivt. 0.052* 0.052* -0.054 -0.054 0.110*** 0.110*** -0.067 -0.067
(1.784) (1.784) (-1.213) (-1.213) (3.501) (3.501) (-0.407) (-0.407)
Pop. growth -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.891*** -0.891*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 2.111*** 2.111***
(-2.929) (-2.929) (-5.402) (-5.402) (4.922) (4.922) (3.429) (3.429)
Adjusted R² 0.206 0.206 0.207 0.207 0.093 0.093 0.134 0.134
Fisher-test 34.439*** 34.439*** 34.555*** 34.555*** 14.249*** 14.249*** 19.998*** 19.998***
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 899 855 855
L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. UM:Upper Middle. Ivt: Investment. Pop: population. *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Set: Set of Instruments. 
3.2 Second-stage regressions
Table 2 addresses two principal concerns: (1) the ability of political regimes to explain 
cross-country differences in consumer prices and; (2) the ability of the instruments to explain 
consumer prices beyond political regime channels. Firstly, we notice the null hypothesis of 
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the Hausman test is rejected in all the regressions: confirming the presence of endogeneity 
and justifying our estimation approach. The significance of estimated coefficients address the 
first issue; thus we notice that in comparison to democratic institutions, authoritarian regimes 
exert a higher effect on inflation. The control variable is significant with the right sign. We 
also notice substantial evidence of constant deflationary pressures(negative intercept).  The 
Sargan  test  for  OIR addresses  the  second issue.  We find  support  for  the  validity  of  the 
instruments since the null hypothesis of the OIR test is not rejected for all the models. This 
suggests  that  the  instruments  do  not  explain  consumer  prices  beyond  political-regime 
mechanisms. 
Table 2 : Politics and consumer prices
Consumer Price Index(Inflation)
First  Set  of   Instruments Second Set of Instruments
Constant -151.282** -153.006** -151.282** -153.006**
(-2.355) (-2.394) (0.018) (-2.394)
Democracy 10.756*** --- 10.756*** ---
(2.757) (2.757)
Polity 2(Revised) --- 10.636*** --- 10.636***
(2.804) (2.804)
Autocracy 16.144** 26.719** 16.144** 26.719**
(2.238) (2.498) (2.238) (2.498)
Population growth 32.443** 33.272** 32.443** 33.272**
(2.445) (2.490) (2.445) (2.490)
Hausman-test 132.637*** 137.764*** 132.637*** 137.764***
OIR-Sargan test 1.228 0.950 1.228 0.950
P-value [0.267 ] [0.329] [0.267] [0.329]
Adjusted R² 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Fisher Statistics 2.948** 3.035** 2.948** 3.035**
Observations 989 989 989 989
1st  Set of Instruments Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
2nd  Set of Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.
4. Conclusion
The motivations of the Arab Spring that have marked the history of humanity over the 
last  few months  have left  political  economists,  researchers,  governments  and international 
policymakers pondering over how the quality of political institutions affect consumer welfare 
in terms of commodity prices. Our findings suggest that  in comparison with authoritarian 
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regimes,  democracies  better  provide  for  institutions  that  keep the  inflation  of  commodity 
prices in check.  As a policy implication, improving the quality of democratic institutions will 
ameliorate  consumer  welfare  through   lower  inflation  rates.  Such  government  quality 
institutional  determinants  include,  among  others:  voice  and  accountability,  rule  of  law, 
regulation quality, control of corruption and press freedom.
.
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